ABSTRACT Complex network is the quantitative expression of a complex process, which reflects the interactivity and relevance of nodes in the network. The financing of technology-based small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in the new third board market may be affected by multifold factors. Therefore, their financing decision-making is a complex process. Financing complex networks are built on the basis of selected financing data from 2015 to 2017 of technology-based SMEs which are the nodes of financing complex networks. This paper explores whether the introduction and enforcement of relevant laws and regulations will affect the financing decisions of SMEs based on the analysis of the distribution of degree value in financing complex networks. We also research into the impact of relevant regulatory changes on the critical factors of enterprises' financing decisions. Nodes with distinct characteristics are selected through analyzing and comparing the degree values of the nodes, whose financing data in different financial disclosure cycles are used. This paper provides a new perspective for quantitative analysis of the empirical study on the effective regulation state of the financing law for technology-based SMEs.
I. INTRODUCTION
In China, technology-based SMEs refer to the knowledgeintensive economic entities of a certain scale, whose dominant business mode is to acquire independent intellectual property rights and transform them into high-tech products or services. They have sound business conditions, and meet the state requirements for scientific research personnel, research and development investment and comprehensive evaluation indexes of scientific and technological achievements. Such enterprises have a strong potential for growth, but they need to undertake the mission of ''self-financing for selfdevelopment.'' Compared with traditional large enterprises, they are small in scale, with the total number of employees under 500, annual sales revenue less than RMB 200 million, and the total value of assets within 200 million yuan, mainly intangible assets e.g. patents, and lack of real assets. Such emerging products do not match financing requirements of traditional financial markets, and therefore it is difficult to The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zhong-Ke Gao. obtain loans from financial institutions and meet the listing requirements of the floor market. The financing problem has long been there since its emergence. In response, China has established the national SME share transfer system in 2012, namely the New Third Board. The new third board since its inception, has benefited from relevant policies. It is the financing platform set up specifically for supporting the development of SMEs, but at the early stage, the established regulations are mostly at macro-level and ambiguous, while the number of enterprises listed in new third board is minimum. In 2015, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched ''Guidance on Strengthening the Supervision of Non-Listed Public Companies'' and ''Several Opinions on Further Promoting the Development of the National SME Share Transfer System''. By the end of 2016, the number of listed companies surged to 10163. The number was merely 5129 in 2015. This suggests that the introduction of normative documents strongly stimulates the listing and financing of SMEs. However, 2017 witnessed marginal increase with only 11,630 listed enterprises. The enthusiasm of SMEs for listing and financing waned, indicating that the introduction of relevant documents failed to play a continuous incentive role for SMEs' financing. SMEs still have financing difficulties.
In the existing literature, most of the studies of finance and economics are conducted from the perspective of qualitative analysis or use mathematical modeling methods to predict the influence of internal or external factors on enterprises [1] - [6] . Complex network theory has been applied to interdisciplinary research in recent years. In a complex network, the components are nodes and connected edges, which represent the interaction between nodes. Scholars have proposed many approaches to adopt complex networks in their studies and have demonstrated its advantages in many fields. There are some researches using network method to study companies' financial issues. These researches use complex network to study US equity market [7] , use powerlaw model to construct the network to reflect stock market behavior [8] , construct Pearson and partial correlation-based network to reveal the structure of world stock market [9] , analyze the connectedness among finance and insurance sectors based on Grander-causality networks [10] , investigate volatility connectedness in Chinese banking system and in the cryptocurrency market by using the volatility spillover network [11] , [12] , make model predictions to discuss the effects of small banks on economic growth [13] , propose a risk spillover network for analyzing the interconnectedness across financial institutions [14] and construct dynamic tail-event driven networks to investigate the systemic risk of China's financial institutions [15] . In previous research, we have analyzed the influence of governance structure on financing strategies [16] . Different from those researches, in this study, we use enterprises' financing data to construct the financing complex network and through analyzing financing strategy and its changing trend of enterprises in the same community, we figure out the influence of CSRC new regulations on companies' financing decisions. Complex network theory has been applied in other fields, such as timeseries analysis [17] , [18] , emotion recognition [19] , communication networks [20] , information prediction [21] , [22] , characterizing fatigued behavior [23] , industrial multiphase flow system [24] , and so on.
We provide new research ideas and methods for the study on financing of technology-based SMEs. We adopt the complex network analysis method, utilize the financing data of 60 technology-based SMEs from CCER dataset, with 13 indicators and take technology-based SMEs as the nodes in the complex network. By constructing the financing complex network of each financial disclosure cycle, the degree value of the nodes is taken as the primary index to determine the representative nodes in the network and conduct deep analysis on their financing data. Firstly, we compare the distribution of degree values in each financing complex network to analyze whether the implementation of CSRC new regulations is an external factor affecting the financing of technology-based SMEs. Then taking representative nodes of financing complex networks as samples, we analyze their financing data before and after listing, revealing how CSRC new regulations affect the financing of SMEs in the new third board market. Next, we further analyze advantages and disadvantages of the normative legal documents in financing practice, then find out the problems that restrict technology-based SMEs' listing in new third board market, and further gives the corresponding measures, in light of providing better legal protection for SMEs' financing through new third board market.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
Complex network plays an important role in many natural systems. It can describe different kinds of complex systems which contain a huge amount of units with nodes and edges separately representing the component units and the interaction between nodes. In this research, we construct a financing complex network where nodes stand for enterprises and the edge is determined by the strength of correlation between nodes, which means the similarity between companies. The correlation between two nodes is determined by the correlation between financing indicators. According to the method proposed by Prof. Gao and Jin [25] , here we illustrate how to use the strength of correlation between indicators to establish the edges and then form the complex network. We use indicators of small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises' financing data to produce characteristic villustrate the financing complexector. For each pair of characteristic vectors, T i and T j , the correlation coefficient can be written as:
M is the dimension of the characteristic vector and
The elements C ij are limited to the interval −1 ≤ C ij ≤ 1 in which C ij = 1, 0, and −1, respectively represent the perfect correlations, no correlation and perfect anti-correlations. C is a symmetric matrix and C ij characterizes the state of the connection between node i and j. Last, selecting an important threshold r c and then adjacency matrix A can be formed by translating the correlation matrix C. The principles of conversion are as follow:
It means if |C ij | ≥ r c , there will form an edge connecting node i and j, otherwise, there will be no edge. The complex network consists of all the nodes and edges and the adjacency matrix A can reveal the corresponding topological structure. Newman (2004) proposed an idea of modularity q. It is a quality function that tests whether the division of vertices into different communities is meaningful and then we can establish community structure [26] .
Supposing that a network has n vertices. For a certain network divided into two parts, we set s i = 1 if the vertex i is in part 1 and s i = −1 if the vertex i is in part 2. And we annotate A ij as the number of edges between vertices i and j. Although A ij could be some large values in certain situations, it is 0 or 1 in most cases (there is always 0 or 1 edge between two vertices). But the expected number of edges between vertices i and j is, if edges are placed at random, where k i and k j are the degrees of the vertices and m = 1 2 i k i is the total number of edges in the network. The modularity can be written as
where s is the vector whose elements are the s i . The leading factor of 1/4m issued for compatibility with the previous definition of modularity. Then we can have a new real symmetric matrix B with elements
which is called the modularity matrix. We are focusing on the properties of this matrix. For now, we just know the elements of each the rows and columns are sum up to zero, therefore there is always an eigenvector (1,1, 1. . . ) with eigenvalue zero. Given Eq. (3), we can let s as a linear combination of the normalized eigenvectors u i of B, therefore
a i u i with.After that we have.
where β i is the eigenvalue of B mapping at eigenvector u i . Furthermore, we take away the leading factor of 1/4m for making it brief. The algorithm described above only uses the signs of the elements of the leading eigenvector and the magnitudes convey information. Vertices related to elements of larger magnitude make large contributions to the modularity, and conversely for small ones. It shows that changing a vertex corresponding to a small magnitude element from group to another makes little difference to Q. Namely, elements' magnitudes are a measurement of ''how much'' a vertex be a part of one community or another. That is to say, for vertices with elements near zero, they are on the borderline in communities. So the algorithm not only let us divides the vertices into groups, but let us changes them on a continuous scale of what degree they are part of one group or another. If a specific partition no longer produces within community edges and that would be expected by the random counterpart, Q = 0. Values other than 0 indicate deflection from randomness.
The detection of community structure in complex network is of vital importance and attracts much attention. It may be the best thought of as a data analysis method used to illustrate the structure of network datasets such as social network in this paper. In this paper, the approach for detecting the community structure is based on the approach proposed by Newman [27] .
Normally, community structure approaches assume network of interest that naturally divides into subgroups and the purpose is to find out these groups. Besides, community structure approaches may particularly recognize the possibility that there exists no good division of the network, a result that is itself considered to be of interest for its influence on the topology of the network. In consideration of the freedom that we can choose the size of our groups of vertices, the greatest value of the coefficient (u T i ) in this term can be achieved. Dividing the vertices according to the signs of the elements in u 1 , following the principle that all vertices whose corresponding elements in u 1 are positive go into one group and the rest in the other group. The algorithm is: we calculate the major eigenvector of the modularity matrix and according to the signs of corresponding elements in this vector divide the vertices into groups.
The connections of resulting network are characterized by the threshold r c . The pairs of nodes with weak correlations will be connected even if r c is extremely small. Under such situation, the physical content of correlations in time series will be hidden. The number of connections among nodes will reduce with the value of r c increasing and more noise will be revealed. However, heretofore, there has not been a general method used for determining the critical threshold.
In this research, we can estimate a range of r c where the structure of complex network is relatively stable and we use Q to select the critical threshold r c . In particular, in spite of simulating a specific process of the complex network, a critical threshold r c can be figured out. For example, decreasing the number of connections through increasing the value of r c and keeping the modularity which determines network almost unchanged. According to Newman' algorithm, when values of Q are greater than 0.3, it reflects significant community structure, and then we can find out the threshold [26] .
The degree value is the basic parameter in the network topology structure, and it is used to describe the direct influence of the nodes in the static network. The degree value of node i is
where d (i) represents the degree value of the node. The average degree value is the average of degree value of all nodes in the network [28] ,
In this paper, we use degree value and average degree value as key parameters to identify the importance of nodes in the network.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Figs. 1-6 illustrate the financing complex network diagrams of the 60 technology-based SMEs financing data in different financial disclosure cycles (from June 2015 to December 2017).
Based on these financing complex networks, we draw conclusions from two perspectives. 
A. ANALYSIS ON THE INFLUENCE OF NORMATIVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS ON ENTERPRISE FINANCING
We calculate the degree value distribution of each financing complex network, as shown in Fig.7 . in the financing complex network of june 2016, the average degree value of the network is much higher than that of other networks, and the degree value of more than 25 nodes is higher than 25. This means that the financing data of these nodes are highly similar and closely related to each other. It is difficult to attribute this to the development of individual enterprises, and we should analyze the reasons from the whole development environment. The development of new third board is mainly from the policy support. Specification files released in early stage, including ''Decision of the State Council on Issues Concerning the National Share Transfer System for SMEs'', ''Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Unlisted Public Companies'' are still not mature and mainly as the principle regulation, failing to build a sound policy environment or provide institutional guarantee for SMEs' financing. In May and November 2015, CSRC continuously issued ''Guidance on Strengthening the Supervision of NonListed Public Companies'' and ''Several Opinions on Further Promoting the Development of the National SME Share Transfer System''. On the basis of Securities Law, Company Law, decisions mentioned above and the regulatory measures previously implemented by the CSRC, more specific provisions for the new third board are provided. The new regulations redefine the financing threshold, stipulate the formal review for enterprises to enter the new third board and exit mechanism, strengthen the financing strength by standardizing the market making of securities firms, canceling the limit on the number of financing shareholders and other norms, and clarify the scope of information disclosure and supervision of the CSRC. Normative documents are more operable and enforceable, making the financing decision-making direction of smes listed on the new third board clearer.
In order to further observe whether the changes shown in the above normative documents have a real impact on enterprises, we observe the changes in the amount of shortterm loans of all enterprises before and after the implementation of CSRC new regulations, as shown in Fig. 8 :
It can be seen that after the enforcement of CSRC new regulations, the proportion of enterprises with short-term loan presents an upward trend. The upward trend lasts for one and a half years, reaching a peak in June 2017 and then declining at the end of 2017. This reflects that in the short term, CSRC new regulations provide a good external environment for SMEs. Especially, the responsibility requirement for each subject in the field of information disclosure and the detailed regulations for market supervision weaken financial institutions' concern to provide loans to SMEs. Therefore, the new regulations promote their debt financing. So after the introduction of CSRC new regulations, the number of debt financing on smes increases.
In order to further analyze the changes of debt financing and equity financing of these enterprises after the enforcement of CSRC new regulations, we select several nodes with VOLUME 7, 2019 high short-term loans and high degree value in the reporting period June 2016 as sample enterprises, observe the change characteristics of short-term loans and total equity to analyze the financing changes. As shown in Fig.9-10: Through the above statistics, we figure out that shortly after the implementation of CSRC new regulations, the shortterm loans of most selected enterprises has emerged ''out of nothing'' since 2016, and within a year after that, shortterm loans of smes present a rapidly rising trend, for instance, enterprises with stock code 832638 and 833205 is basically show a linear ascending tendency. Moreover, the total equity capital of these enterprises has shown a steady or rising trend since the implementation of the new regulations, and some enterprises, such as the two enterprises mentioned above, show a multiple growth during the half-year report period right after the implementation of the new regulation.
The above analysis shows that the implementation of new regulations does promote enterprise's financing.
Based on the above analysis, we believe that normative legal documents have a positive impact on sme financing based on the following aspects:
(1) The re-classification of financing threshold and further meeting the financing needs of enterprises. The third board market implement internal stratification, including basic layer and innovation layer. The threshold for enterprises in basic layer is relatively lower than original ones, and for enterprises in innovation layer is higher. It provides different financing platforms for different enterprises and promote their financing.
(2) The specified form of examination improves the efficiency of smes' listing on the new third board. The regulations only specify the compliance review of documents for enterprises entering the new third board market, which is conducive to improving the audit efficiency.
(3) It clarifies the subject of information disclosure responsibility, stipulates the enterprise as the first responsible person, encourages the enterprise to timely fulfill the obligation of information disclosure, safeguards the right of banks and other financial institutions and investors, and enables them to better evaluate the enterprise and make decisions.
(4) It points out to explore the elimination of the limit on the number of shareholders in financing, which is equivalent to sending a signal to enterprises to expand the scope of offering. At the same time, the regulation points out that the market making ability of the host securities firm should be enhanced to make enterprises more flexible in financing and improve the success rate of financing.
(5) While expanding the scope of offering, the enterprises adhere to the original investor access conditions. Considering the immaturity of the new third board market at present, it makes a balance between encouraging financing and protecting investors. In order to avoid blind investment, the regulations protect the rights and interests of investors.
(6) By dividing the division of labor and cooperation between administrative supervision and market selfregulation, the scope of supervision of each subject VOLUME 7, 2019 is clarified, making the supervision more operable and establishing confidence for financial institutions such as banks and investors.
(7) The establishment of market withdrawal mechanism is conducive to ensuring the flexibility of the new third board market, ensuring the quality of listed enterprises, and thus guaranteeing the investment rights and interests.
The above factors can be attributed to the concretization of the provisions. Too principled or directive rules cannot provide clear signal to SMEs, and also unable to ease the financial institutions and financial consumer concern. So only by refining the provisions, the behavior of all participants in the new third board market will be clearer. To be specific, enterprises will understand the system direction of financing strategy, financial institutions can evaluate the risk of smes based on a transparent disclosure of information, and financial consumers can also define their investment direction according to the development trend of new third board. Therefore, we conclude that it is important to create a reasonable policy environment for SMEs with better operability of the provisions which should be in line with the law of market development.
B. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW THIRD BOARD LISTING SYSTEM ON ENTERPRISES' FINANCING
To further study whether the financing of enterprises listed on the new third board is affected by the external influence of legal and other regulatory documents, we select nine nodes with higher degree values in all six complex networks as representatives for holistic analysis.
1) THE IMPACT OF THE NEW THIRD BOARD LISTING SYSTEM ON CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING
First, the short-term loans statistics of the sample data are shown in Table 1 .
From the data analysis of the six reporting periods from June 2015 to December 2017, we find very few values for the debt financing indicators of the sample enterprises. For the most part, the values for short-term loans, loans from central banks, long-term loans, and other indicators are almost zero. A small number of enterprises have short-term loans in individual years, while there is a time interval of more than one year between the year of the short-term loans and the time of listing. For example, the company with stock number 430434 was listed in January 2014, but it took shortterm loans in June 2015, and company with stock number 830836 was listed in January 2014, but took short-term loans in December 2015. This indicates that difficulty in securing debt financing is still the main problem for the financing of SMEs. Even since 2016, CSRC issued the new regulations, the short-term loans of enterprises listed on the new third board market have not changed significantly, and the new regulations of the CSRC and the listing of enterprises have not shown prominent correlation. The conclusion is that the listing of enterprises has no impact on their debt financing, and the enterprises listed on the new third board have not been affected by the external factors of CSRC new regulations.
Traditional financial institutions are still the main providers of debt financing to technology-based SMEs. These institutions mainly consider debt-paying ability when deciding whether to provide loans, though such enterprises lack real uncommitted assets, making it difficult to provide guarantees. In addition, because the financial information is not public, it is difficult for financial institutions to evaluate their credit. Although CSRC new regulations have made more specific provisions on the requirements for information disclosure and market regulation, there are still problems in reality. On the one hand, some SMEs are still not standardized, and they fail to fulfill their information disclosure duties in a timely manner. On the other hand, even if these enterprises disclose information as required, the strength and scale of the enterprises cannot meet the requirements of loans provided by traditional financial institutions such as banks. The listing of such enterprises, the development potential in science and technology, and support from government policy will not directly affect the debt-paying ability of these enterprises, so it is difficult for technology-based SMEs to obtain loans from financial institutions. The real reason is that the technology-based SMEs have their own particularities and do not match the traditional claims financing requirements. In response, the following suggestions are made for the particularity of such enterprises:
(1) We should broaden the financing channels for technology-based SMEs. Private lending, Internet finance, and other emerging financial industries are regulated in accordance with the law. Currently, there are no uniform laws and regulations governing the non-financial institutions financial industry in China. Although in recent years, relevant judicial interpretations were issued for private lending, and guidance and special governance programs were issued for the multisectoral alliance for internet finance, these regulations did not effectively end the financial market turmoil, so it is really necessary to formulate a national non-financial institutions management law to break the monopoly of traditional financial institutions and promote legal compliance among nonfinancial institutions.
(2) China should improve the credit evaluation mechanism and credit guarantee system for technology-based SMEs. Compared to large enterprises, technology-based SMEs are obviously inferior in uncommitted assets and capital scale and have difficulty obtaining loans from financial institutions such as banks through guarantees. However, they have intangible properties, such as technology and patents, which differ from the general guarantees stipulated in Securities Law. Therefore, the government or relevant departments should set up new credit guarantee systems for these specific characteristics. Meanwhile, the credit evaluation system should consider the size of funds, technical patent results, risk aversion ability, and other factors for such enterprises, while establishing more scientific evaluation standards. The evaluation and evaluation mechanisms of financial institutions and non-financial institutions should also be consistent with the evaluation mechanism established by the government.
2) THE IMPACT OF THE NEW THIRD BOARD LISTING SYSTEM ON ENTERPRISES' EQUITY FINANCING
The above data analysis shows that the listing of technologybased SMEs affects their paid-in capital (total equity) and capital reserve. Through comparing the data before and after the listing of such companies, we can find that the general capital of most enterprises tends to increase dramatically and exponentially within one year (for some enterprises, within one and a half years) after listing, and the capital reserve will also fluctuate greatly in that year. What's more, some enterprises substantially reduce capital reserves in a range far greater than the growth of general capital. For example, after the listing of enterprise with stock code 830770 in February 2014, the share capital increased from 500,000 to 15,000,000 at the end of 2014, which was doubled in one year, and the capital reserve also dropped directly from 314,528.73 in 2013 to zero. In the whole year of 2014, the capital reserve is zero, and the change in capital reserve is far more than that of equity. Though it remains unchanged for some enterprises, which indicates that listing the enterprises will affect equity financing, and the effect of financing growth will appear quickly one year after listing. The effect of financing growth is shown in Figure 11 .
The new third board experienced rapid development for the agency system in 2006, to the pilot in three locations in 2012 and the national promotion in 2013. Since 2014, the number of listed companies surged with low entry threshold for listing, and financial consumers usually consider the scale of corporate funds firstly to judge the current development status, and then anticipate the future development of the firm through the firm's listing and the relevant policy environment in a comprehensive analysis to make commercial decisions, who are obviously not as conservative as financial institutions but provide access to financing opportunities for non-listed public enterprises. Therefore, the protection of the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 11. The changes of total equity and capital reserve after one year of listing.
policy environment is particularly important for the listing of technology-based SMEs.
In this regard, strengthening the support for listing of technology-based SMEs requires further legalization of policies. The Securities Law imposes stricter restrictions on the listing of enterprises, which are too high for SMEs. Fortunately, the new third board set in 2006 is a good springboard, in which the listing incentives can provide equity financing for enterprises and fulfill financial consumer preferences. technology-based SMEs play a major role in the innovation, entrepreneurship, and employment in China, so it is necessary to obtain policy support to solve the financing difficulties of such enterprises. After the new third board expanded to cover the whole country, various local governments also introduced incentive policies, such as direct incentives including systemchanging subsidies, listing subsidies, and tax reductions and exemptions, as well as indirect incentives, including opening green channels and providing some convenient services. However, these policies reflect regional differences and characteristics and are therefore inconsistent. After all, these are only short-term excitations. In 2015, CSRC new regulations focused on the specific regulations on the legal and compliant operation of technology-based SMEs, however, at present, China lacks regulations on incentives for the promotion of financing for SMEs at the legal system level, which requires the integration with effective policies in various regions to make it a national legal system. In addition, qualified enterprises should have a convenient reporting mechanism as a long-term incentive mechanism.
3) SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE NEW THIRD BOARD SYSTEM ON CORPORATE EQUITY FINANCING
Post-listing, the total share capital of most enterprises remains stable or small increase starting in the second year. For example, company number 430434 was listed in 2014. Its total share capital increased from 13,410,000 in 2013 to 24,138,000 in 2014, and further, to 44,434,600 in 2015. The total share capital over the two years roughly doubled, while in the second year after listing (2016), the total share capital was 44,669,600, and remained unchanged in 2017 with little increase, as shown in Figure 12 .
This shows that listing a company does not provide a sustained effect on equity financing, and it is impossible for such enterprises to obtain continuous financing through listing, as in a floor trading market for several reasons.
On the one hand, the financing model of the new third board is mainly oriented to capital increase, and the transaction occurs mainly through the agreement transfer method. Even if the market maker system is introduced into CSRC new regulations, it does not play the role of early price detection and market activation, and the new third board's liquidity is still poor so the increase in equity in the later stage of listing is small. On the other hand, the low threshold and institutional incentives of the new third board cannot completely eliminate financial consumers' risk concerns, and investors become conservative in the later stage of listing, so investment slows down and the financing scale on the new third board tends to ease, which reflects that the quality of the listed companies is worthy of scrutiny. CSRC new regulations only provide a broad development direction in other diversified trading systems and investor relations management systems, without specific rules. And they only propose a system to be established, but there is no detailed regulation about how to operate realistically. In addition, there is also a lack of regulations for the enterprise delisting system. Therefore, the new third board still lacks specific, reasonable and operational systems, and it is difficult to continuously obtain the confidence and preferences of financial consumers. In this regard, the following recommendations are made:
(1) The new third board requires improved trading mechanisms, enhanced transaction liquidity and diversified trading model, so that it could play its role of continuous financing. Although the new third board has introduced market transfer in 2014, the transfer by agreement is still the main mode in practice, and there are still many problems among market makers in China. In contrast, listed companies tend to be in a strong position, which results in an insufficient market competition. Therefore, Chinese regulators should improve the market maker system as the direction of entry, introduce a market competition mechanism, and expand the scope of market makers. Meanwhile, regulators should also clarify the rights and obligations of market makers, and reasonably learn from the market players' superiority in the liquidity of large-value transactions to enhance their enthusiasm in market making in the new third board.
(2) In addition, regulators should formulate an information service platform for technology-based SMEs, and improve the risk assessment system for such enterprises. Although the requirements for information disclosure were clarified in the ''Business Rules of National SME Share Transfer System (Trial)'', it does not specify the content of the disclosure clearly. There are still problems with the transparency of such enterprises, especially the opacity of the financial system, which will increase risk in the financial market and information asymmetry. The government or relevant departments should lead the establishment of an information service platform, and force SMEs to disclose their financial positions and information about other important situations at all stages. It is also necessary to formulate a risk assessment system suitable for such enterprises, and set scientific risk assessment standards that combine various types of information about these enterprises, especially the technology patent capability to provide a reasonable basis for other market participants' decision making and increase information transparency. Additionally, regulators should improve the delisting system and formulate a reasonable transfer mechanism, and promote a multi-level financing market, which can help standardize financing activities. China is committed to setting up a multi-level capital market and actively developing the floor trading and over-the-counter markets to meet the financing needs of different types of enterprises. However, there is no good docking between various sectors and the delisting rate in China is extremely low, which makes it difficult to guarantee the quality of listed companies and increases the potential risks for financial consumers. Notably the new third board has low entry barriers and strong policy support, which makes it more difficult to guarantee the quality of listed companies.
(3) Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to set up a reasonable transfer system and a ''green channel'' to transfer the new third boards to the startup board or to the regional equity transfer market, so that qualified enterprises can move to a new board in time and continue financing in the appropriate capital market. On the other hand, enterprises that are difficult to reorganize, integrate, or are on the verge of bankruptcy should be delisted in a timely manner, as should those that cannot meet mandatory requirements such as listing information disclosure. These measures can help ensure the ''purity'' of the new third board market.
The results of community detection reflect different patterns of enterprises' financing strategy. To be specific, if the size of community is large, it means those enterprises in the same community have similar financing strategy, and the characteristics of financing are prominent, therefore it is desirable to analyze such financing features and then further study the causes especially the influence of related factors on enterprises' financing. We choose nodes with high degree value in communities and analyze the financing data in 2015-2017, from the aspect of debt financing, equity financing and the changing trend. Then referring to relevant policy, we reveal the influence of CSRC new regulations on technology-based SMEs' financing process, and moreover, propose the idea about how to improve policy making for solving the difficulty in financing and protect SMEs' benefits.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Through using financing data of technology-based SMEs, we construct financing complex network, detect the community in enterprises. Then we explore and analyze the characteristics of the community structure, and analyze whether the financing of technology-based SMEs after the listing on new third board is affected by CSRC new regulations. In addition, according to the existing blanks and imperfection of CSRC new regulations, we analyze the correlation between financing dilemma and legal incentive on new third board market for technology-based SMEs. The complex network makes the analysis of the financing characteristics of SMEs clearer and intuitive. By using complex network construction and corresponding data analysis, we conclude that refined normative legal documents do have a positive impact on technology-based SMEs debt financing and equity financing in a certain period of time. However, according to the overall analysis of the new third board market, their debt financing and equity financing will not be externally and persistently affected by CSRC new regulations. Even though they are greatly encouraged by the policy incentives within one year of listing, they cannot produce a sustained effect. The reason is that CSRC new regulations lack detailed rules on the relevant systems, and the relevant incentive policies have not yet risen to a long-term mechanism as a legal system. For this, we focus on improving the current legal environment by referring to the relevant laws and regulations and propose legal improvement measures to solve the difficulties SMEs are faced with in terms of financing and to further protect the technology-based SMEs' financing in the new third board market.
